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Abstract We consider the use of advertising expenses as quality signals in
multiproduct firms, extending previous results on single product firms. In our model,
a firm introduces sequentially two products whose qualities are positively correlated.
We investigate whether there exist information spillovers from the first to the second
market. We show that, when correlation is high, the equilibrium in market 2 depends
on the quality reputation the firm has gained in market 1. Moreover, if a firm with a
high-quality product 1 wants to separate from its low-quality counterpart, it needs to
advertise more in this market than if the qualities of the two products are unrelated.
This advertising level signals not only high quality in the firstmarket, but also the likely
quality of the second product. Thus, advertising in the first market has information
spillovers in the second market.
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1 Introduction
Many firms in real world produce more than one good, and the quality of these goods
is often correlated.1 However economic literature has mainly dealt with the case of
1 Common examples of this are car producers, soft drink producers, and others.
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